In the draft judgment, footnote 96, the head of the TelAviver rabbinical court, Rabbi Chaim Shlomo Shaanan, heard the case of a woman who was trying to activate a marriage agreement reached in Israel in 1997. The language of the agreement is identical to the Hebrew text of the American agreement. Footnote 97 Over five pages, Rabbi Shaanan sets out a number of reasons for demonstrating that the husband`s commitment is null and void, both under Halakha and under Israeli law, and concludes that, even if it were valid, it is necessary to take a strict position and decide that a sanction that requires a person to pay creates a forced maintenance. His principled position is set out at the beginning of his speech: even the rabbinical judges, who theoretically insist on describing him as a serious halachic problem, do not give up on organizing Gittin despite the marital support granted in the civil court, and even if they felt in the past that they did not arrange Gittin in these circumstances. For example, Rabbi Dichovsky, whose opposition to the agreement we saw above, writes in the same article on the agreement that, in many cases, the marital support of the civil court is the verdict against Halakha and imposed high payments on the husband who cares about a forced. Footnote 118 In the distant past, Rabbi Dichovsky believed that the support of the woman`s spouse is granted to the civil court, is theft and that it affects the divorce process. Footnote 119 But he has changed his mind, and in the final years of his tenure, there are no similar judgments. In a later article, he even criticized the rabbinical courts, which in the past have held that an action in marital support raised doubts about the validity of the get, saying that it was possible to “organize a get without fear, even if the support of the spouse was granted irregularly or excessively.” Footnote 120 The concept behind the agreement is divorce for each spouse, even without acceptable reason. This concept is alien to the world of the Torah and derived from other domains … .
A framework in which, for no good reason, either the spouse can dissolve the marriage, even after decades, without the need to explain or conduct a substantive discussion. Footnote 92 82 Notice of another Rabbi Judge of Beth Din of America, in a lesson on the agreement, see Rabbi Michoel Zylberman, Contemporary Topics in Even HaEzer 8: Prenuptial Agreements, YUTorah Online (August 13, 2015), tinyurl.com/z98wob7. From minute 22, Rabbi Zylberman mentions Rabbi Lavi and his refusal of divorce on appeal, as exists in practice in the agreement (see below), but finds that even if Rabbi Lavi is in principle right, we have no alternative because we live in a society where people separate without boarding, and we do not have the capacity to marry them. Of course, this implies that the reality of the diaspora is a reality that requires leniency, unlike the situation in Israel. Rabbi Yerachmiel Seplowitz, a member of the CAR Executive Committee, said he had heard of many CAR members who voted against the Prenup. 84 Rivlin, Ram, Religious Norms between Ethics and Law: The Death and the Afterlife of Jewish Divorce Law, 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 469, 476-77 (2015) CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“These agreements reflect clear support for the ignorance of Western norms in Jewish divorce law”).